Law

The Wireless Telegraphy (Licence Award) Regulations 2025

United Kingdom · regulation

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In force since 2025-06-30, as the publisher states.

Copy read on 2026-11-10. The page it was read from

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives.

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Contents: 139 provisions
  1. Title and introductory text
  2. 1 Citation, commencement and extent
  3. 2 Interpretation
  4. 3 Applications for the grant of a licence
  5. 4 Application
  6. 5 Notification of names of applicants and associates
  7. 6 Recording of applicant group members
  8. 7 Subsequent changes to bidder groups
  9. 8 Fitness to hold a licence
  10. 9 Qualification to participate in the award process
  11. 10 Publication of names of qualified applicants
  12. 11 Withdrawal of an application
  13. 12 Determination of number of bidders
  14. 13 Additional deposit before the first principal stage round
  15. 14 Determination of a bidder’s eligibility limit for the first principal stage round
  16. 15 Principal stage, assignment stage and grant stage
  17. 16 Principal stage rounds
  18. 17 Principal stage bids
  19. 18 Total number of lots of each type
  20. 19 Notification of information to bidders before the first principal stage round
  21. 20 Lot prices for the first principal stage round
  22. 21 First principal stage round bids on the auction system
  23. 22 Posted demand number after the end of the first round
  24. 23 Determination by OFCOM of posted price after the end of the first round
  25. 24 Determination by OFCOM of excess demand after the end of the first round
  26. 25 Notification of information to bidders before the second (and each subsequent) principal stage round
  27. 26 The price range
  28. 27 Each bidder must make three sets of bids in the second (and each subsequent) principal stage round
  29. 28 The set of bids to be submitted if a bidder wishes to maintain demand for lots at the clock price in the current round
  30. 29 The set of bids to be submitted if a bidder wishes to increase demand for lots at the clock price in the current round
  31. 30 The set of bids to be submitted if a bidder wishes to decrease demand for lots at the clock price in the current round
  32. 31 Failure to specify a target number of lots on the auction system within the time period for bidding in a round
  33. 32 Creating a ranking list of sets of bids and carrying out a selection process with regard to sets of bids on the list in order to determine each bidder’s posted demand number
  34. 33 Calculating the price point for all sets of bids where a bidder decreased demand
  35. 34 Calculating the price point for all sets of bids where a bidder increased demand
  36. 35 Creating a ranking list which contains sets of bids to decrease demand and sets of bids to increase demand
  37. 36 Selecting sets of bids from the ranking list
  38. 37 Remaking the ranking list after each selection
  39. 38 The completion of the selection process
  40. 39 Currently selected demand for lots of a particular type
  41. 40 Current excess demand for lots of a particular type
  42. 41 Criteria for determining if a set of bids to decrease demand is to be removed or accorded reduced status
  43. 42 Currently used eligibility points for a bidder
  44. 43 Criteria for determining if a set of bids to increase demand is to be removed or accorded reduced status for the 26 GHz lower lot type and 26 GHz upper lot type
  45. 44 Criteria for determining if a set of bids to increase demand is to be removed or accorded reduced status for the 40 GHz lot type
  46. 45 Determination by OFCOM of posted demand numbers
  47. 46 Posted demand number in the case of sets of bids to maintain demand
  48. 47 Posted demand number in the case of sets of bids to increase demand and sets of bids to decrease demand
  49. 48 Determination by OFCOM of posted price
  50. 49 Determination of excess demand by OFCOM
  51. 50 Eligibility rule
  52. 51 Eligibility points associated with lots
  53. 52 Eligibility limit in the first round
  54. 53 Eligibility limit in the second and subsequent rounds
  55. 54 Eligibility points used by a bidder
  56. 55 Deposits during the principal stage
  57. 56 Deposit constraint on bidding
  58. 57 Publication of information at the end of each day during the principal stage
  59. 58 Number of principal stage rounds
  60. 59 Determination of the winning principal stage bids
  61. 60 Determination of base price
  62. 61 Determination of total base price
  63. 62 Notification of results to bidders
  64. 63 Publication of the results of the principal stage
  65. 64 Required final principal stage deposit
  66. 65 No assignment stage if there are no winning principal stage bidders
  67. 66 Assignment stage
  68. 67 Assignment stage process
  69. 68 Bidders
  70. 69 Assignment stage bidder definitions
  71. 70 Bidding for numbered 40 GHz lots for the first period and the second period in the first assignment stage round
  72. 71 Preparing a 40 GHz lots assignment stage options list for each bidder
  73. 72 40 GHz assignment stage bids
  74. 73 Determination of the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids
  75. 74 Determination of 40 GHz lot additional prices
  76. 75 Bidding for numbered 26 GHz lower lots for the first period in the first assignment stage round
  77. 76 Preparing a 26 GHz lower assignment stage options list for each bidder
  78. 77 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids
  79. 78 Determination of the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids
  80. 79 Determination of 26 GHz lower lot first period additional prices
  81. 80 Bidding for numbered 26 GHz upper lots for the first period in the second assignment stage round
  82. 81 Preparing a 26 GHz upper lot assignment stage options list for each bidder
  83. 82 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids
  84. 83 Determination of the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids
  85. 84 Determination of 26 GHz upper lot first period additional prices
  86. 85 Assignment of 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots for the second period without bidding
  87. 86 Assignment of 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots for the second period with bidding
  88. 87 Preparing a 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage options list for each bidder
  89. 88 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids
  90. 89 Determination of the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids
  91. 90 Determination of 26 GHz lot second period additional prices
  92. 91 Notification to bidders before each assignment stage round
  93. 92 Assignment stage form
  94. 93 Submission of assignment stage forms to OFCOM
  95. 94 Valid assignment stage form
  96. 95 Notification that an assignment stage form is not valid
  97. 96 Alternative method for submission of assignment stage form
  98. 97 Incomplete or defective assignment stage form
  99. 98 Required first assignment stage round deposit
  100. 99 Required second assignment stage round deposit
  101. 100 Required third assignment stage round deposit
  102. 101 Notification of results of the assignment stage
  103. 102 Interpretation
  104. 103 Determination of licences, licence fees and frequencies associated with particular licences
  105. 104 Licences which may be granted under this award process
  106. 105 Licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 40 GHz licence
  107. 106 Licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 26 GHz lower lot first period licence
  108. 107 Licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 26 GHz upper lot first period licence
  109. 108 Licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 26 GHz lot second period licence
  110. 109 Particular frequencies to be included in a 40 GHz licence granted to a winning bidder
  111. 110 Particular frequencies to be included in a 26 GHz lower lot first period licence granted to a winning bidder
  112. 111 Particular frequencies to be included in a 26 GHz upper lot first period licence granted to a winning bidder
  113. 112 Particular frequencies to be included in a 26 GHz lot second period licence granted to a winning bidder
  114. 113 Determination of the total auction sum payable by winning bidders to OFCOM
  115. 114 Notification of the total auction sum payable by winning bidders to OFCOM
  116. 115 Further payment where the amount of a winning bidder’s deposit is less than its total auction sum
  117. 116 Entitlement to the grant of licences
  118. 117 Grant of licences
  119. 118 Deposit greater than total auction sum
  120. 119 Notification to bidders following the grant of licences
  121. 120 Completion of the award process
  122. 121 Forfeit of deposit and exclusion from award process
  123. 122 Bids made by an excluded bidder
  124. 123 Events
  125. 124 Alternative method for submission of principal stage bids
  126. 125 General power of exclusion
  127. 126 Notification to OFCOM
  128. 127 Changes to timing or location
  129. 128 Changes to round times and use of auction system
  130. 129 Rerunning rounds
  131. 130 Refunds
  132. 131 Deposits
  133. SCHEDULE 1 Lots
  134. SCHEDULE 2 Application form and warranty
  135. SCHEDULE 3 Document for member of applicant’s applicant group or bidder group who is not an associate
  136. SCHEDULE 4 Determination of 40 GHz lot additional prices
  137. SCHEDULE 5 Determination of 26 GHz lower lot first period additional prices
  138. SCHEDULE 6 Determination of 26 GHz upper lot first period additional prices
  139. SCHEDULE 7 Determination of 26 GHz lot second period additional prices

Proposed changes to this act

No one has proposed a change to this act yet.

139 provisions

40 Current excess demand for lots of a particular type

At any time, the current excess demand for lots of a particular type is equal to— (a) the sum of currently selected demand for that lot type across all bidders; less (b) the total number of lots of that type which are available in the award process.

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41 Criteria for determining if a set of bids to decrease demand is to be removed or accorded reduced status

(1) When determining if a set of bids to decrease demand on the ranking list is to be removed or accorded reduced status, OFCOM shall carry out the steps in paragraphs (2) to (9). (2) In relation to the lot type in question, if the current excess demand is zero or less than zero, the set of bids shall not be removed from the ranking list. (3) If the current excess demand is greater than zero, then the set of bids shall be removed if the condition in paragraph (4) is satisfied. (4) The condition is that if the target number of lots for the set of bids in question were to replace the currently selected demand for lots of that type for the bidder in question and the current excess demand for all bidders were to be recalculated on that basis, the recalculated current excess demand would be zero or greater than zero. (5) If a set of bids is removed OFCOM shall change the currently selected demand for the bidder in question for the relevant lot type to the target number of lots of that type for the set of bids which has been removed. (6) Subject to paragraph (8), if the set of bids is not removed, OFCOM shall consider whether that set of bids is to be accorded reduced status. (7) That set of bids shall be accorded reduced status if current excess demand across all bidders for the lot type in question is greater than zero. (8) If an all or nothing set of bids to decrease demand is not removed, it shall not be accorded reduced status. (9) If a set of bids is accorded reduced status— (a) OFCOM shall subtract the current excess demand from the currently selected demand for the bidder and the lot type in question; and (b) the number calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) shall replace the currently selected demand for the bidder for the lot type in question.

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42 Currently used eligibility points for a bidder

(1) At any time during the selection process, the “currently used eligibility points” for any particular bidder is calculated as the sum of— (a) currently selected demand for 26 GHz lower lot for that particular bidder multiplied by 2; (b) currently selected demand for 26 GHz upper lots for that particular bidder multiplied by 2; and (c) currently selected demand for 40 GHz lots for that particular bidder. (2) At any time during the selection process, the “current eligibility capacity” for any particular bidder is calculated as the difference between— (a) the bidder’s eligibility limit following the most recent round; and (b) the bidder’s currently used eligibility points.

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43 Criteria for determining if a set of bids to increase demand is to be removed or accorded reduced status for the 26 GHz lower lot type and 26 GHz upper lot type

(1) When determining if a set of bids to increase demand on the ranking list for 26 GHz lower lots or 26 GHz upper lots is to be removed or accorded reduced status, OFCOM shall carry out the steps in paragraphs (2) to (7). (2) In relation to the bidder in question, if the current eligibility capacity is equal to or lower than 1, the set of bids may not be removed. (3) If the current eligibility capacity is equal to or greater than 2, then the set of bids shall be removed if the condition in paragraph (4) is satisfied. (4) The condition is that, if the target number of lots for the set of bids in question were to replace that bidder’s currently selected demand for lots of that type, the bidder’s recalculated current eligibility capacity would be equal to or greater than zero. (5) If a set of bids is removed OFCOM shall change the currently selected demand for the bidder in question for the relevant lot type to the target number of lots. (6) If the set of bids is not removed, and current eligibility capacity for the bidder in question is equal to or greater than 2, the set of bids shall be accorded reduced status. (7) If a set of bids is accorded reduced status OFCOM shall replace the currently selected demand for the bidder in question for the relevant lot type by the number calculated in accordance with paragraph (8). (8) The number is— (a) the currently selected demand for the bidder in question for the relevant lot type added to a number equal to half of the bidder’s current eligibility capacity; and (b) if the number resulting from the calculation in sub-paragraph (a) is a number that is not a whole number, OFCOM shall round down that number to the nearest whole number.

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44 Criteria for determining if a set of bids to increase demand is to be removed or accorded reduced status for the 40 GHz lot type

(1) When determining if a set of bids to increase demand on the ranking list for 40 GHz lots is to be removed or accorded reduced status, OFCOM shall carry out the following steps in paragraphs (2) to (7). (2) In relation to the bidder in question, if the current eligibility capacity is equal to zero, the set of bids may not be removed nor reduced. (3) If the current eligibility capacity is greater than zero, then the set of bids shall be removed if the condition in paragraph (4) is satisfied. (4) The condition is that if the target number of lots for the set of bids in question were to replace that bidder’s currently selected demand for lots of that type, the bidder’s recalculated current eligibility capacity would be equal to or greater than zero. (5) If a set of bids is removed OFCOM shall change the currently selected demand for the bidder in question for the relevant lot type to the target number of lots. (6) If the set of bids is not removed, and current eligibility capacity for the bidder in question is greater than zero, the set of bids shall be accorded reduced status. (7) If a bid is accorded reduced status OFCOM shall increase the currently selected demand for the bidder in question by the number of lots equal to the bidder’s current eligibility capacity.

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45 Determination by OFCOM of posted demand numbers

After the completion of the selection process after the second and subsequent principal stage rounds OFCOM shall determineeach bidder’s posted demand number for each lot type in accordance with regulations 46 and 47.

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46 Posted demand number in the case of sets of bids to maintain demand

If, for a particular lot type, a bidder specified a target number of lots which was the same as the notified posted demand number for that bidder for that lot type (following the most recent round) the target number of lots shall be that bidder’s posted demand number.

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47 Posted demand number in the case of sets of bids to increase demand and sets of bids to decrease demand

If, for a particular lot type, a bidder specified a target number of lots that is higher than or lower than the bidder’s notified posted demand number for that lot type (following the most recent round), that bidder’s posted demand number for that lot type shall be the same number as that bidder’s currently selected demand after the completion of the selection process.

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48 Determination by OFCOM of posted price

(1) After the completion of the selection process after the second (and after each subsequent) principal stage round, OFCOM shall determine the posted price for each lot type in accordance with paragraphs (2) to (6). (2) If the current excess demand for lots of a lot type is greater than zero, OFCOM shall set the posted price for that lot type equal to the clock price for that round for that lot type. (3) If the current excess demand for lots of a lot type is equal to zero and at least one simple set of bids to decrease demand or one all or nothing set of bids to decrease demand for that lot type has been removed or accorded reduced status, OFCOM shall set the posted price for that lot type as equal to the highest nominated price amongst the nominated prices of all simple sets of bids to decrease demand and the all or nothing sets of bids to decrease demand for that lot type which have been removed or accorded reduced status. (4) If the current excess demand for lots of a lot type is equal to zero and no simple set of bids to decrease demand and no all or nothing set of bids to decrease demand for that lot type has been removed or accorded reduced status, OFCOM shall set the posted price for that lot type equal to the opening price for that round for that lot type. (5) If the current excess demand for lots of a lot type is lower than zero, OFCOM shall set the posted price for that lot type as equal to the opening price for that round for that lot type. (6) The posted price for each lot type shall be the same for all bidders.

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49 Determination of excess demand by OFCOM

(1) After the completion of the selection process, OFCOM shall determineexcess demand for each lot type. (2) In respect of any particular lot type, the excess demand at the end of the round shall be the same number as that lot type’s current excess demand.

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50 Eligibility rule

(1) The eligibility rule is that the eligibility points associated with a bidder’s submission of the three bids in the first principal stage round, the three sets of bids to be made in the second principal stage round, or the three sets of bids to be made in each subsequent principal stage round, must not exceed that bidder’s eligibility limit for the round. (2) In the first principal stage round the number of eligibility points associated with a bidder’s submission of the three bids are the sum of— (a) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz lower lot multiplied by the number of 26 GHz lower lots comprised within that bidder’s bid; (b) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz upper lot multiplied by the number of 26 GHz upper lots comprised within that bidder’s bid; (c) the eligibility points associated with a 40 GHz lot multiplied by the number of 40 GHz lots comprised within that bidder’s bid. (3) In the subsequent principal stage rounds, the eligibility points associated with a bidder’s submission of the three sets of bids are the sum of— (a) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz lower lot multiplied by that bidder’s target number for such lots; (b) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz upper lot multiplied by that bidder’s target number for such lots; (c) the eligibility points associated with a 40 GHz lot multiplied by that bidder’s target number for such lots.

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51 Eligibility points associated with lots

The number of eligibility points associated with lots are— (a) 2 eligibility points for each 26 GHz lower lot; (b) 2 eligibility points for each 26 GHz upper lot; and (c) 1 eligibility point for each 40 GHz lot.

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52 Eligibility limit in the first round

In the first principal stage round a bidder’s eligibility limit is determined in accordance with regulation 14.

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53 Eligibility limit in the second and subsequent rounds

In the second and subsequent principal stage rounds, a bidder’s eligibility limit shall be equal to the number of eligibility points used by the bidder in the most recent round.

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54 Eligibility points used by a bidder

(1) The number of eligibility points used by a bidder in the most recent round shall be equal to the number of eligibility points associated with that bidder’s notified posted demand number. (2) The eligibility points associated with a bidder’s notified posted demand number are the sum of— (a) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz lower lot multiplied by that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz lower lots; (b) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz upper lot multiplied by that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz upper lots; (c) the eligibility points associated with a 40 GHz lot multiplied by that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 40 GHz lots.

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55 Deposits during the principal stage

(1) Where, after the end of any principal stage round, the amount a bidder has on deposit with OFCOM for the purposes of the award process is less than the bidder’s financial exposure, as described in paragraph (2), OFCOM may, having regard to the desirability of securing an efficient outcome to the principal stage, notify the bidder that it is required to pay a further sum in pounds as a deposit. (2) A bidder’s financial exposure after the end of a principal stage round shall be the amount in pounds which is equal to the sum of— (a) that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz lower lots, multiplied by the posted price for 26 GHz lower lots; (b) that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz upper lots, multiplied by the posted price for 26 GHz upper lots; and (c) that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 40 GHz lots, multiplied by the posted price for 40 GHz lots. (3) The further sum shall be an amount determined by OFCOM such that the total amount that the bidder is required to have on deposit is at most the amount of the bidder’s highest financial exposure after the end of any of the previous principal stage rounds before OFCOM gave notice to the bidder under paragraph (1). (4) Any such sum must be paid into OFCOM’s bank account with accompanying information which identifies the bidder, by a deadline specified by OFCOM. (5) Where a bidder does not satisfy the requirements set out in paragraph (4), OFCOM shall notify the bidder of that fact.

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56 Deposit constraint on bidding

(1) Where, after the end of a principal stage round, OFCOM has notified a bidder under regulation 55(5) that it has not complied with the requirement to pay a further sum as a deposit, that bidder— (a) may not bid in the next principal stage round nor in any subsequent principal stage rounds; (b) shall be deemed in future principal stage rounds: (i) to have submitted a bid to maintain demand, in respect of a lot type for which it had a notified posted demand of zero following the most recent round; or (ii) to have submitted a simple set of bids to decrease demand, selected a target number of zero lots and nominated the opening price, in respect of a lot type for which it had a notified posted demand greater than zero following the most recent round. (c) may not submit an assignment stage form in any assignment stage round and shall be deemed to have made a valid assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for each of its assignment stage options. (2) Such a bidder shall not be excluded from the award process for that reason. (3) Any principal stage bids made by that bidder may become winning principal stage bids in accordance with regulation 59.

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57 Publication of information at the end of each day during the principal stage

After the end of the latest principal stage round to take place on any given day, OFCOM shall publish on their website, in relation to that latest principal stage round— (a) the posted price for each lot type; and (b) the excess demand for each lot type.

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58 Number of principal stage rounds

(1) After the determination of excess demand for each lot type after the end of each principal stage round, OFCOM shall determine if there shall be a further principal stage round. (2) A further principal stage round shall occur if, after the end of the most recent round, excess demand, for at least one lot type, equals a positive number greater than zero. (3) If a further principal stage round is not required, the principal stage shall come to an end.

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59 Determination of the winning principal stage bids

When OFCOM have determined that there shall not be any principal stage rounds, each bidder shall be recorded as having won— (a) the number of lots corresponding to that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz lower lots following the final principal stage round; (b) the number of lots corresponding to that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz upper lots following the final principal stage round; and (c) the number of lots corresponding to that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 40 GHz lots following the final principal stage round.

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60 Determination of base price

(1) The base price for a 26 GHz lower lot (“26 GHz lower base price”) shall be equal to the posted price for that lot type for the final principal stage round. (2) The base price for a 26 GHz upper lot (“26 GHz upper base price”) shall be equal to the posted price for that lot type for the final principal stage round. (3) The base price for a 40 GHz lot (“40 GHz base price”) shall be equal to the posted price for that lot type for the final principal stage round.

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61 Determination of total base price

(1) A reference to a winning bidder’s “total 26 GHz lower base price” is a reference to the 26 GHz lower base price multiplied by the number of 26 GHz lower lots won by that bidder. (2) A reference to a winning bidder’s “total 26 GHz upper base price” is a reference to the 26 GHz upper base price multiplied by the number of 26 GHz upper lots won by that bidder. (3) A reference to a winning bidder’s “total 40 GHz base price” is a reference to the 40 GHz base price multiplied by the number of 40 GHz lots won by that bidder. (4) A reference to “total base price” in respect of a bidder, is a reference to the sum of that bidder’s total 26 GHz lower base price (if any), 26 GHz upper base price (if any) and the total 40 GHz base price (if any).

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62 Notification of results to bidders

After the end of the final principal stage round, the determination of the winning principal stage bids and the determination of the base price for each winning principal stage bid, OFCOM shall notify each bidder of— (a) the end of the principal stage; (b) the names of the winning bidders, and in respect of each of them— (i) the number of 26 GHz lower lots won and the total 26 GHz lower base price; (ii) the number of 26 GHz upper lots won and the total 26 GHz upper base price; and (iii) the number of 40 GHz lots won and the total 40 GHz base price; and (c) the number of 26 GHz lower lots, the number of 26 GHz upper lots and the number of 40 GHz lots not won by any bidder.

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63 Publication of the results of the principal stage

After the notification given in accordance with regulation 62, OFCOM shall publish on their website— (a) the names of the winning bidders, and in respect of each of them— (i) the number of 26 GHz lower lots won and the total 26 GHz lower base price; (ii) the number of 26 GHz upper lots won and the total 26 GHz upper base price; and (iii) the number of 40 GHz lots won and the total 40 GHz base price. (b) the number of 26 lower GHz lots, 26 upper GHz lots and 40 GHz lots not won by any bidder.

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64 Required final principal stage deposit

(1) After the final principal stage round, a further sum in pounds must be paid into OFCOM’s bank account with accompanying information which identifies the bidder, by a deadline specified by OFCOM (“required final principal stage deposit”). (2) In respect of any bidder, the required final principal stage deposit shall be an amount such that the total amount that the bidder has on deposit is not less than the amount which is that bidder’s total base price. (3) Where a bidder does not satisfy the requirements set out in paragraph (1) and (2)— (a) OFCOM shall notify the bidder; and (b) the bidder shall not be excluded from the award process, but may not make assignment stage bids, and will be deemed to have made valid assignment stage bids with a value of zero pounds for its assignment stage options.

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65 No assignment stage if there are no winning principal stage bidders

Where there are no winning bidders following completion of the principal stage, there shall be no assignment stage and no licences shall be granted.

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66 Assignment stage

Where there is one winning bidder, or more than one winning bidder, following completion of the principal stage, OFCOM shall determine the assignment of particular numbered lots following the assignment stage process.

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67 Assignment stage process

The steps in the assignment stage process are— (a) step one: the first assignment stage round for the assignment of 40 GHz lots for the first period and the second period, and for the assignment of 26 GHz lower lots for the first period; (b) step two: the second assignment stage round for the assignment of 26 GHz upper lots for the first period; (c) step three: the assignment of 26 GHz upper lots and 26 GHz lower lots for the second period without bidding; and (d) step four: the third assignment stage round for the assignment of any 26 GHz lower lots and any 26 GHz upper lots (which were not assigned without bidding under step three) for the second period by bidding. (2) Step three shall only take place if there are any 26 GHz lower only lot winners, any 26 GHz upper only lot winners or a single 26 GHz double lot winner. (3) Step four, the third assignment stage round, shall only take place if there are two or more 26 GHz double lot winners.

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68 Bidders

(1) Only 26 GHz lower lot winners and 40 GHz lot winners may bid in the first assignment stage round. (2) Only 26 GHz upper lot winners may bid in the second assignment stage round. (3) Only 26 GHz double lot winners may bid in the third assignment stage round.

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69 Assignment stage bidder definitions

In these Regulations— (a) “26 GHz lower lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 26 GHz upper lots or not and irrespective of whether they have won 40 GHz lots or not) has won 26 GHz lower lots. (b) “26 GHz lower only lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 40 GHz lots or not)— (i) has won 26 GHz lower lots; and (ii) has not won 26 GHz upper lots. (c) “40 GHz lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 26 GHz lots or not) has won 40 GHz lots. (d) “26 GHz upper lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 26 GHz lower lots or not and irrespective of whether they have won 40 GHz lots or not) has won 26 GHz upper lots. (e) “26 GHz upper only lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 40 GHz lots or not)— (i) has won 26 GHz upper lots; and (ii) has not won 26 GHz lower lots. (f) “26 GHz double lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 40 GHz lots or not) has won 26 GHz lower lots and also 26 GHz upper lots.

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70 Bidding for numbered 40 GHz lots for the first period and the second period in the first assignment stage round

(1) Any 40 GHz lot winner may bid in the first assignment stage round for the assignment of 40 GHz lots for the first period and the second period. (2) A 40 GHz assignment stage bid shall be a bid for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies corresponding to the particular numbered 40 GHz lots in a block of numbered 40 GHz lots. (3) OFCOM shall determine which blocks of numbered 40 GHz lots a bidder may bid for, and notify that bidder of its determination. (4) The list of possible blocks of numbered 40 GHz lots provided to each bidder may be different for each bidder. (5) The list shall be known as the “40 GHz lots assignment stage options list” and each block of numbered 40 GHz lots in that list shall be known as a “40 GHz lots assignment stage option”.

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71 Preparing a 40 GHz lots assignment stage options list for each bidder

(1) OFCOM shall determine which 40 GHz assignment stage options shall be included in the 40 GHz assignment stage options list for each bidder which is eligible to bid in accordance with paragraph (2). (2) A bidder’s 40 GHz assignment stage options shall be each of those blocks of numbered 40 GHz lots which satisfy all of the following conditions— (a) the number of 40 GHz lots contained in the block is equal to the number of 40 GHz lots won within that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 40 GHz lots; (b) if that bidder were assigned the 40 GHz lots contained in the block the following two conditions would be satisfied— (i) each other bidder could be assigned 40 GHz lots contained in a block that, in respect of that other bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 40 GHz lots, satisfies the condition in subparagraph (a); (ii) the leftover 40 GHz lots not assigned to that bidder or any other bidder (if any) would form a single block of numbered 40 GHz lots.

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72 40 GHz assignment stage bids

(1) In order to bid for a 40 GHz assignment stage option, a bidder must, on the assignment stage form, specify either a value of zero pounds or an amount in whole thousands of pounds that it is willing to pay, in addition to the total 40 GHz base price for that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 40 GHz lots, for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies corresponding to the block of numbered 40 GHz lots that is the 40 GHz assignment stage option. (2) A bidder may make no more than one 40 GHz assignment stage bid for each 40 GHz assignment stage option. (3) A bidder is not required to make a 40 GHz assignment stage bid. (4) A 40 GHz assignment stage bid is a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid if— (a) the bid is specified on a valid assignment stage form; and (b) the bidder has paid the full sum of the required first assignment stage round deposit by the deadline specified by OFCOM. (5) Where a bidder does not make a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid for a 40 GHz assignment stage option that bidder will be deemed to have made a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 40 GHz assignment stage option. (6) Where there is only one winning principal stage bidder for all of the 40 GHz lots available in the award process, that bidder shall be deemed to have made a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 40 GHz assignment stage option.

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73 Determination of the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids

(1) OFCOM shall determine the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids after the deadline for paying the required first assignment stage round deposit. (2) The winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids shall be those valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids that comprise the winning combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids. (3) The winning combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids shall be the valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids having the highest total value of amounts bid. (4) A combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids is a valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids if— (a) within that combination there is one valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid from each 40 GHz winner; (b) each of those valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids is for a 40 GHz assignment stage option as determined by OFCOM for the bidder; (c) no numbered 40 GHz lot is included in more than one of the 40 GHz assignment stage bids included in the combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids; and (d) the leftover numbered 40 GHz lots not included in that combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids, taken together, form a single block of numbered 40 GHz lots. (5) Where there is more than one valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids for which the total value is equal highest, OFCOM shall employ a method of random selection from amongst those valid combinations of 40 GHz assignment stage bids for which the value is equal highest to determine the winning combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids.

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74 Determination of 40 GHz lot additional prices

In respect of each winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid, OFCOM shall determine an amount in whole pounds (“40 GHz lot additional price”) which shall be payable by the relevant winning bidder in accordance with Schedule 4.

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75 Bidding for numbered 26 GHz lower lots for the first period in the first assignment stage round

(1) Any 26 GHz lower lot winner may bid in the first assignment stage round for the assignment of 26 GHz lower lots for the first period. (2) A 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid shall be a bid for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies for the first period corresponding to the particular numbered 26 GHz lower lots in a block of numbered 26 GHz lower lots. (3) OFCOM shall determine which blocks of numbered 26 GHz lower lots a bidder may bid for and notify that bidder of their determination. (4) The list of possible blocks of numbered 26 GHz lower lots provided to each bidder may be different for each bidder. (5) The list shall be known as the “26 GHz lower assignment stage options list” and each block of 26 GHz lower lots in that list shall be known as a “26 GHz lower assignment stage option”.

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76 Preparing a 26 GHz lower assignment stage options list for each bidder

(1) OFCOM shall determine which 26 GHz lower assignment stage options shall be included in the 26 GHz lower assignment stage options list for each bidder which is eligible to bid in accordance with paragraph (2). (2) A bidder’s 26 GHz lower assignment stage options shall be each of those blocks of numbered 26 GHz lower lots, which satisfy all of the following conditions— (a) the number of 26 GHz lower lots contained in the block is equal to the number of lots won within that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz lower lots; (b) if that bidder were assigned the 26 GHz lower lots contained in the block the following two conditions would be satisfied— (i) each other bidder could be assigned 26 GHz lower lots contained in a block that, in respect of that other bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz lower lots, satisfies the condition in subparagraph (a); and (ii) the leftover 26 GHz lower lots not assigned to that bidder or any other bidder would form a single block of numbered 26 GHz lower lots which would include 26 GHz lot 1; (c) if the bidder is a 26 GHz double lot winner, at least one of the following three conditions would be satisfied— (i) the block would include 26 GHz lot 7; (ii) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz double lot winner) which would include 26 GHz lot 7; or (iii) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz double lot winner) which would itself be adjacent to a block in a series of other contiguous blocks of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to 26 GHz double lot winners), provided that one block in this series would include 26 GHz lot 7; and (d) if the bidder is a 26 GHz lower only lot winner, at least one of the following four conditions would be satisfied— (i) the block would include 26 GHz lot 1; (ii) the block would be adjacent to the block of leftover 26 GHz lower lots; (iii) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz lower only lot winner) which would include 26 GHz lot 1; (iv) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz lower only lot winner) which would itself be adjacent to a block in a series of other contiguous blocks of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to 26 GHz lower only lot winners), provided that one block in this series would include 26 GHz lot 1; or (v) the block would be adjacent to a block in a series of contiguous blocks, which comprises the block of leftover 26 GHz lower lots and blocks containing 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to 26 GHz lower only lot winners).

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77 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids

(1) In order to bid for a 26 GHz lower assignment stage option, a bidder must specify on the assignment stage form either a value of zero pounds or an amount in whole thousands of pounds that it is willing to pay, in addition to the total 26 GHz lower base price for that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz lower lots, for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies corresponding to the block of numbered 26 GHz lower lots that is the 26 GHz lower assignment stage option. (2) A bidder may make no more than one 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for each 26 GHz lower assignment stage option. (3) A bidder is not required to make a 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid. (4) A 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid is a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid if— (a) the bid is specified on a valid assignment stage form; and (b) the bidder has paid the full sum of the required first assignment stage round deposit by the deadline specified by OFCOM. (5) Where a bidder does not make a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for a 26 GHz lower assignment stage option that bidder will be deemed to have made a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 26 GHz lower assignment stage option. (6) Where there is only one assignment stage option on a bidder’s 26 GHz lower assignment stage options list, that bidder shall be deemed to have made a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 26 GHz lower assignment stage option.

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78 Determination of the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids

(1) OFCOM shall determine the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids after the deadline for paying the required first assignment stage round deposit. (2) The winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids shall be those valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids that comprise the winning combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids. (3) The winning combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids shall be the valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids having the highest total value of amounts bid. (4) A combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids is a valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids if— (a) within that combination there is one valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid from each winning bidder for 26 GHz lower lots; (b) each of those valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids is for a 26 GHz lower assignment stage option as determined by OFCOM for the bidder; (c) no numbered 26 GHz lower lot is included in more than one of the 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids included in the combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids; and (d) the leftover numbered 26 GHz lower lots not included in that combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids, taken together, form a single block of numbered 26 GHz lower lots which would include 26 GHz lot 1. (5) Where there is more than one valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids for which the total value is equal highest, OFCOM shall employ a method of random selection from amongst those valid combinations of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids for which the value is equal highest to determine the winning combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids.

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79 Determination of 26 GHz lower lot first period additional prices

In respect of each winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid, OFCOM shall determine an amount in whole pounds (“26 GHz lower lot first period additional price”) which shall be payable by the relevant winning bidder in accordance with Schedule 5.

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