40 Current excess demand for lots of a particular type
At any time, the current excess demand for lots of a particular type is equal to—
(a) the sum of currently selected demand for that lot type across all bidders; less
(b) the total number of lots of that type which are available in the award process.
41 Criteria for determining if a set of bids to decrease demand is to be removed or accorded reduced status
(1) When determining if a set of bids to decrease demand on the ranking list is to be removed or accorded reduced status, OFCOM shall carry out the steps in paragraphs (2) to (9).
(2) In relation to the lot type in question, if the current excess demand is zero or less than zero, the set of bids shall not be removed from the ranking list.
(3) If the current excess demand is greater than zero, then the set of bids shall be removed if the condition in paragraph (4) is satisfied.
(4) The condition is that if the target number of lots for the set of bids in question were to replace the currently selected demand for lots of that type for the bidder in question and the current excess demand for all bidders were to be recalculated on that basis, the recalculated current excess demand would be zero or greater than zero.
(5) If a set of bids is removed OFCOM shall change the currently selected demand for the bidder in question for the relevant lot type to the target number of lots of that type for the set of bids which has been removed.
(6) Subject to paragraph (8), if the set of bids is not removed, OFCOM shall consider whether that set of bids is to be accorded reduced status.
(7) That set of bids shall be accorded reduced status if current excess demand across all bidders for the lot type in question is greater than zero.
(8) If an all or nothing set of bids to decrease demand is not removed, it shall not be accorded reduced status.
(9) If a set of bids is accorded reduced status—
(a) OFCOM shall subtract the current excess demand from the currently selected demand for the bidder and the lot type in question; and
(b) the number calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) shall replace the currently selected demand for the bidder for the lot type in question.
(1) At any time during the selection process, the “currently used eligibility points” for any particular bidder is calculated as the sum of—
(a) currently selected demand for 26 GHz lower lot for that particular bidder multiplied by 2;
(b) currently selected demand for 26 GHz upper lots for that particular bidder multiplied by 2; and
(c) currently selected demand for 40 GHz lots for that particular bidder.
(2) At any time during the selection process, the “current eligibility capacity” for any particular bidder is calculated as the difference between—
(a) the bidder’s eligibility limit following the most recent round; and
(b) the bidder’s currently used eligibility points.
43 Criteria for determining if a set of bids to increase demand is to be removed or accorded reduced status for the 26 GHz lower lot type and 26 GHz upper lot type
(1) When determining if a set of bids to increase demand on the ranking list for 26 GHz lower lots or 26 GHz upper lots is to be removed or accorded reduced status, OFCOM shall carry out the steps in paragraphs (2) to (7).
(2) In relation to the bidder in question, if the current eligibility capacity is equal to or lower than 1, the set of bids may not be removed.
(3) If the current eligibility capacity is equal to or greater than 2, then the set of bids shall be removed if the condition in paragraph (4) is satisfied.
(4) The condition is that, if the target number of lots for the set of bids in question were to replace that bidder’s currently selected demand for lots of that type, the bidder’s recalculated current eligibility capacity would be equal to or greater than zero.
(5) If a set of bids is removed OFCOM shall change the currently selected demand for the bidder in question for the relevant lot type to the target number of lots.
(6) If the set of bids is not removed, and current eligibility capacity for the bidder in question is equal to or greater than 2, the set of bids shall be accorded reduced status.
(7) If a set of bids is accorded reduced status OFCOM shall replace the currently selected demand for the bidder in question for the relevant lot type by the number calculated in accordance with paragraph (8).
(8) The number is—
(a) the currently selected demand for the bidder in question for the relevant lot type added to a number equal to half of the bidder’s current eligibility capacity; and
(b) if the number resulting from the calculation in sub-paragraph (a) is a number that is not a whole number, OFCOM shall round down that number to the nearest whole number.
44 Criteria for determining if a set of bids to increase demand is to be removed or accorded reduced status for the 40 GHz lot type
(1) When determining if a set of bids to increase demand on the ranking list for 40 GHz lots is to be removed or accorded reduced status, OFCOM shall carry out the following steps in paragraphs (2) to (7).
(2) In relation to the bidder in question, if the current eligibility capacity is equal to zero, the set of bids may not be removed nor reduced.
(3) If the current eligibility capacity is greater than zero, then the set of bids shall be removed if the condition in paragraph (4) is satisfied.
(4) The condition is that if the target number of lots for the set of bids in question were to replace that bidder’s currently selected demand for lots of that type, the bidder’s recalculated current eligibility capacity would be equal to or greater than zero.
(5) If a set of bids is removed OFCOM shall change the currently selected demand for the bidder in question for the relevant lot type to the target number of lots.
(6) If the set of bids is not removed, and current eligibility capacity for the bidder in question is greater than zero, the set of bids shall be accorded reduced status.
(7) If a bid is accorded reduced status OFCOM shall increase the currently selected demand for the bidder in question by the number of lots equal to the bidder’s current eligibility capacity.
45 Determination by OFCOM of posted demand numbers
After the completion of the selection process after the second and subsequent principal stage rounds OFCOM shall determineeach bidder’s posted demand number for each lot type in accordance with regulations 46 and 47.
46 Posted demand number in the case of sets of bids to maintain demand
If, for a particular lot type, a bidder specified a target number of lots which was the same as the notified posted demand number for that bidder for that lot type (following the most recent round) the target number of lots shall be that bidder’s posted demand number.
47 Posted demand number in the case of sets of bids to increase demand and sets of bids to decrease demand
If, for a particular lot type, a bidder specified a target number of lots that is higher than or lower than the bidder’s notified posted demand number for that lot type (following the most recent round), that bidder’s posted demand number for that lot type shall be the same number as that bidder’s currently selected demand after the completion of the selection process.
(1) After the completion of the selection process after the second (and after each subsequent) principal stage round, OFCOM shall determine the posted price for each lot type in accordance with paragraphs (2) to (6).
(2) If the current excess demand for lots of a lot type is greater than zero, OFCOM shall set the posted price for that lot type equal to the clock price for that round for that lot type.
(3) If the current excess demand for lots of a lot type is equal to zero and at least one simple set of bids to decrease demand or one all or nothing set of bids to decrease demand for that lot type has been removed or accorded reduced status, OFCOM shall set the posted price for that lot type as equal to the highest nominated price amongst the nominated prices of all simple sets of bids to decrease demand and the all or nothing sets of bids to decrease demand for that lot type which have been removed or accorded reduced status.
(4) If the current excess demand for lots of a lot type is equal to zero and no simple set of bids to decrease demand and no all or nothing set of bids to decrease demand for that lot type has been removed or accorded reduced status, OFCOM shall set the posted price for that lot type equal to the opening price for that round for that lot type.
(5) If the current excess demand for lots of a lot type is lower than zero, OFCOM shall set the posted price for that lot type as equal to the opening price for that round for that lot type.
(6) The posted price for each lot type shall be the same for all bidders.
(1) After the completion of the selection process, OFCOM shall determineexcess demand for each lot type.
(2) In respect of any particular lot type, the excess demand at the end of the round shall be the same number as that lot type’s current excess demand.
(1) The eligibility rule is that the eligibility points associated with a bidder’s submission of the three bids in the first principal stage round, the three sets of bids to be made in the second principal stage round, or the three sets of bids to be made in each subsequent principal stage round, must not exceed that bidder’s eligibility limit for the round.
(2) In the first principal stage round the number of eligibility points associated with a bidder’s submission of the three bids are the sum of—
(a) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz lower lot multiplied by the number of 26 GHz lower lots comprised within that bidder’s bid;
(b) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz upper lot multiplied by the number of 26 GHz upper lots comprised within that bidder’s bid;
(c) the eligibility points associated with a 40 GHz lot multiplied by the number of 40 GHz lots comprised within that bidder’s bid.
(3) In the subsequent principal stage rounds, the eligibility points associated with a bidder’s submission of the three sets of bids are the sum of—
(a) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz lower lot multiplied by that bidder’s target number for such lots;
(b) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz upper lot multiplied by that bidder’s target number for such lots;
(c) the eligibility points associated with a 40 GHz lot multiplied by that bidder’s target number for such lots.
The number of eligibility points associated with lots are—
(a) 2 eligibility points for each 26 GHz lower lot;
(b) 2 eligibility points for each 26 GHz upper lot; and
(c) 1 eligibility point for each 40 GHz lot.
53 Eligibility limit in the second and subsequent rounds
In the second and subsequent principal stage rounds, a bidder’s eligibility limit shall be equal to the number of eligibility points used by the bidder in the most recent round.
(1) The number of eligibility points used by a bidder in the most recent round shall be equal to the number of eligibility points associated with that bidder’s notified posted demand number.
(2) The eligibility points associated with a bidder’s notified posted demand number are the sum of—
(a) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz lower lot multiplied by that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz lower lots;
(b) the eligibility points associated with a 26 GHz upper lot multiplied by that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz upper lots;
(c) the eligibility points associated with a 40 GHz lot multiplied by that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 40 GHz lots.
(1) Where, after the end of any principal stage round, the amount a bidder has on deposit with OFCOM for the purposes of the award process is less than the bidder’s financial exposure, as described in paragraph (2), OFCOM may, having regard to the desirability of securing an efficient outcome to the principal stage, notify the bidder that it is required to pay a further sum in pounds as a deposit.
(2) A bidder’s financial exposure after the end of a principal stage round shall be the amount in pounds which is equal to the sum of—
(a) that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz lower lots, multiplied by the posted price for 26 GHz lower lots;
(b) that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz upper lots, multiplied by the posted price for 26 GHz upper lots; and
(c) that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 40 GHz lots, multiplied by the posted price for 40 GHz lots.
(3) The further sum shall be an amount determined by OFCOM such that the total amount that the bidder is required to have on deposit is at most the amount of the bidder’s highest financial exposure after the end of any of the previous principal stage rounds before OFCOM gave notice to the bidder under paragraph (1).
(4) Any such sum must be paid into OFCOM’s bank account with accompanying information which identifies the bidder, by a deadline specified by OFCOM.
(5) Where a bidder does not satisfy the requirements set out in paragraph (4), OFCOM shall notify the bidder of that fact.
(1) Where, after the end of a principal stage round, OFCOM has notified a bidder under regulation 55(5) that it has not complied with the requirement to pay a further sum as a deposit, that bidder—
(a) may not bid in the next principal stage round nor in any subsequent principal stage rounds;
(b) shall be deemed in future principal stage rounds:
(i) to have submitted a bid to maintain demand, in respect of a lot type for which it had a notified posted demand of zero following the most recent round; or
(ii) to have submitted a simple set of bids to decrease demand, selected a target number of zero lots and nominated the opening price, in respect of a lot type for which it had a notified posted demand greater than zero following the most recent round.
(c) may not submit an assignment stage form in any assignment stage round and shall be deemed to have made a valid assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for each of its assignment stage options.
(2) Such a bidder shall not be excluded from the award process for that reason.
(3) Any principal stage bids made by that bidder may become winning principal stage bids in accordance with regulation 59.
57 Publication of information at the end of each day during the principal stage
After the end of the latest principal stage round to take place on any given day, OFCOM shall publish on their website, in relation to that latest principal stage round—
(a) the posted price for each lot type; and
(b) the excess demand for each lot type.
(1) After the determination of excess demand for each lot type after the end of each principal stage round, OFCOM shall determine if there shall be a further principal stage round.
(2) A further principal stage round shall occur if, after the end of the most recent round, excess demand, for at least one lot type, equals a positive number greater than zero.
(3) If a further principal stage round is not required, the principal stage shall come to an end.
59 Determination of the winning principal stage bids
When OFCOM have determined that there shall not be any principal stage rounds, each bidder shall be recorded as having won—
(a) the number of lots corresponding to that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz lower lots following the final principal stage round;
(b) the number of lots corresponding to that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 26 GHz upper lots following the final principal stage round; and
(c) the number of lots corresponding to that bidder’s notified posted demand number for 40 GHz lots following the final principal stage round.
(1) The base price for a 26 GHz lower lot (“26 GHz lower base price”) shall be equal to the posted price for that lot type for the final principal stage round.
(2) The base price for a 26 GHz upper lot (“26 GHz upper base price”) shall be equal to the posted price for that lot type for the final principal stage round.
(3) The base price for a 40 GHz lot (“40 GHz base price”) shall be equal to the posted price for that lot type for the final principal stage round.
(1) A reference to a winning bidder’s “total 26 GHz lower base price” is a reference to the 26 GHz lower base price multiplied by the number of 26 GHz lower lots won by that bidder.
(2) A reference to a winning bidder’s “total 26 GHz upper base price” is a reference to the 26 GHz upper base price multiplied by the number of 26 GHz upper lots won by that bidder.
(3) A reference to a winning bidder’s “total 40 GHz base price” is a reference to the 40 GHz base price multiplied by the number of 40 GHz lots won by that bidder.
(4) A reference to “total base price” in respect of a bidder, is a reference to the sum of that bidder’s total 26 GHz lower base price (if any), 26 GHz upper base price (if any) and the total 40 GHz base price (if any).
After the end of the final principal stage round, the determination of the winning principal stage bids and the determination of the base price for each winning principal stage bid, OFCOM shall notify each bidder of—
(a) the end of the principal stage;
(b) the names of the winning bidders, and in respect of each of them—
(i) the number of 26 GHz lower lots won and the total 26 GHz lower base price;
(ii) the number of 26 GHz upper lots won and the total 26 GHz upper base price; and
(iii) the number of 40 GHz lots won and the total 40 GHz base price; and
(c) the number of 26 GHz lower lots, the number of 26 GHz upper lots and the number of 40 GHz lots not won by any bidder.
63 Publication of the results of the principal stage
After the notification given in accordance with regulation 62, OFCOM shall publish on their website—
(a) the names of the winning bidders, and in respect of each of them—
(i) the number of 26 GHz lower lots won and the total 26 GHz lower base price;
(ii) the number of 26 GHz upper lots won and the total 26 GHz upper base price; and
(iii) the number of 40 GHz lots won and the total 40 GHz base price.
(b) the number of 26 lower GHz lots, 26 upper GHz lots and 40 GHz lots not won by any bidder.
(1) After the final principal stage round, a further sum in pounds must be paid into OFCOM’s bank account with accompanying information which identifies the bidder, by a deadline specified by OFCOM (“required final principal stage deposit”).
(2) In respect of any bidder, the required final principal stage deposit shall be an amount such that the total amount that the bidder has on deposit is not less than the amount which is that bidder’s total base price.
(3) Where a bidder does not satisfy the requirements set out in paragraph (1) and (2)—
(a) OFCOM shall notify the bidder; and
(b) the bidder shall not be excluded from the award process, but may not make assignment stage bids, and will be deemed to have made valid assignment stage bids with a value of zero pounds for its assignment stage options.
Where there is one winning bidder, or more than one winning bidder, following completion of the principal stage, OFCOM shall determine the assignment of particular numbered lots following the assignment stage process.
The steps in the assignment stage process are—
(a) step one: the first assignment stage round for the assignment of 40 GHz lots for the first period and the second period, and for the assignment of 26 GHz lower lots for the first period;
(b) step two: the second assignment stage round for the assignment of 26 GHz upper lots for the first period;
(c) step three: the assignment of 26 GHz upper lots and 26 GHz lower lots for the second period without bidding; and
(d) step four: the third assignment stage round for the assignment of any 26 GHz lower lots and any 26 GHz upper lots (which were not assigned without bidding under step three) for the second period by bidding.
(2) Step three shall only take place if there are any 26 GHz lower only lot winners, any 26 GHz upper only lot winners or a single 26 GHz double lot winner.
(3) Step four, the third assignment stage round, shall only take place if there are two or more 26 GHz double lot winners.
(1) Only 26 GHz lower lot winners and 40 GHz lot winners may bid in the first assignment stage round.
(2) Only 26 GHz upper lot winners may bid in the second assignment stage round.
(3) Only 26 GHz double lot winners may bid in the third assignment stage round.
In these Regulations—
(a) “26 GHz lower lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 26 GHz upper lots or not and irrespective of whether they have won 40 GHz lots or not) has won 26 GHz lower lots.
(b) “26 GHz lower only lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 40 GHz lots or not)—
(i) has won 26 GHz lower lots; and
(ii) has not won 26 GHz upper lots.
(c) “40 GHz lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 26 GHz lots or not) has won 40 GHz lots.
(d) “26 GHz upper lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 26 GHz lower lots or not and irrespective of whether they have won 40 GHz lots or not) has won 26 GHz upper lots.
(e) “26 GHz upper only lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 40 GHz lots or not)—
(i) has won 26 GHz upper lots; and
(ii) has not won 26 GHz lower lots.
(f) “26 GHz double lot winner” means any winning principal stage bidder who (irrespective of whether they have won 40 GHz lots or not) has won 26 GHz lower lots and also 26 GHz upper lots.
70 Bidding for numbered 40 GHz lots for the first period and the second period in the first assignment stage round
(1) Any 40 GHz lot winner may bid in the first assignment stage round for the assignment of 40 GHz lots for the first period and the second period.
(2) A 40 GHz assignment stage bid shall be a bid for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies corresponding to the particular numbered 40 GHz lots in a block of numbered 40 GHz lots.
(3) OFCOM shall determine which blocks of numbered 40 GHz lots a bidder may bid for, and notify that bidder of its determination.
(4) The list of possible blocks of numbered 40 GHz lots provided to each bidder may be different for each bidder.
(5) The list shall be known as the “40 GHz lots assignment stage options list” and each block of numbered 40 GHz lots in that list shall be known as a “40 GHz lots assignment stage option”.
71 Preparing a 40 GHz lots assignment stage options list for each bidder
(1) OFCOM shall determine which 40 GHz assignment stage options shall be included in the 40 GHz assignment stage options list for each bidder which is eligible to bid in accordance with paragraph (2).
(2) A bidder’s 40 GHz assignment stage options shall be each of those blocks of numbered 40 GHz lots which satisfy all of the following conditions—
(a) the number of 40 GHz lots contained in the block is equal to the number of 40 GHz lots won within that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 40 GHz lots;
(b) if that bidder were assigned the 40 GHz lots contained in the block the following two conditions would be satisfied—
(i) each other bidder could be assigned 40 GHz lots contained in a block that, in respect of that other bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 40 GHz lots, satisfies the condition in subparagraph (a);
(ii) the leftover 40 GHz lots not assigned to that bidder or any other bidder (if any) would form a single block of numbered 40 GHz lots.
(1) In order to bid for a 40 GHz assignment stage option, a bidder must, on the assignment stage form, specify either a value of zero pounds or an amount in whole thousands of pounds that it is willing to pay, in addition to the total 40 GHz base price for that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 40 GHz lots, for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies corresponding to the block of numbered 40 GHz lots that is the 40 GHz assignment stage option.
(2) A bidder may make no more than one 40 GHz assignment stage bid for each 40 GHz assignment stage option.
(3) A bidder is not required to make a 40 GHz assignment stage bid.
(4) A 40 GHz assignment stage bid is a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid if—
(a) the bid is specified on a valid assignment stage form; and
(b) the bidder has paid the full sum of the required first assignment stage round deposit by the deadline specified by OFCOM.
(5) Where a bidder does not make a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid for a 40 GHz assignment stage option that bidder will be deemed to have made a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 40 GHz assignment stage option.
(6) Where there is only one winning principal stage bidder for all of the 40 GHz lots available in the award process, that bidder shall be deemed to have made a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 40 GHz assignment stage option.
73 Determination of the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids
(1) OFCOM shall determine the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids after the deadline for paying the required first assignment stage round deposit.
(2) The winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids shall be those valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids that comprise the winning combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids.
(3) The winning combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids shall be the valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids having the highest total value of amounts bid.
(4) A combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids is a valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids if—
(a) within that combination there is one valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid from each 40 GHz winner;
(b) each of those valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids is for a 40 GHz assignment stage option as determined by OFCOM for the bidder;
(c) no numbered 40 GHz lot is included in more than one of the 40 GHz assignment stage bids included in the combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids; and
(d) the leftover numbered 40 GHz lots not included in that combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids, taken together, form a single block of numbered 40 GHz lots.
(5) Where there is more than one valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids for which the total value is equal highest, OFCOM shall employ a method of random selection from amongst those valid combinations of 40 GHz assignment stage bids for which the value is equal highest to determine the winning combination of valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids.
In respect of each winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid, OFCOM shall determine an amount in whole pounds (“40 GHz lot additional price”) which shall be payable by the relevant winning bidder in accordance with Schedule 4.
75 Bidding for numbered 26 GHz lower lots for the first period in the first assignment stage round
(1) Any 26 GHz lower lot winner may bid in the first assignment stage round for the assignment of 26 GHz lower lots for the first period.
(2) A 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid shall be a bid for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies for the first period corresponding to the particular numbered 26 GHz lower lots in a block of numbered 26 GHz lower lots.
(3) OFCOM shall determine which blocks of numbered 26 GHz lower lots a bidder may bid for and notify that bidder of their determination.
(4) The list of possible blocks of numbered 26 GHz lower lots provided to each bidder may be different for each bidder.
(5) The list shall be known as the “26 GHz lower assignment stage options list” and each block of 26 GHz lower lots in that list shall be known as a “26 GHz lower assignment stage option”.
76 Preparing a 26 GHz lower assignment stage options list for each bidder
(1) OFCOM shall determine which 26 GHz lower assignment stage options shall be included in the 26 GHz lower assignment stage options list for each bidder which is eligible to bid in accordance with paragraph (2).
(2) A bidder’s 26 GHz lower assignment stage options shall be each of those blocks of numbered 26 GHz lower lots, which satisfy all of the following conditions—
(a) the number of 26 GHz lower lots contained in the block is equal to the number of lots won within that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz lower lots;
(b) if that bidder were assigned the 26 GHz lower lots contained in the block the following two conditions would be satisfied—
(i) each other bidder could be assigned 26 GHz lower lots contained in a block that, in respect of that other bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz lower lots, satisfies the condition in subparagraph (a); and
(ii) the leftover 26 GHz lower lots not assigned to that bidder or any other bidder would form a single block of numbered 26 GHz lower lots which would include 26 GHz lot 1;
(c) if the bidder is a 26 GHz double lot winner, at least one of the following three conditions would be satisfied—
(i) the block would include 26 GHz lot 7;
(ii) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz double lot winner) which would include 26 GHz lot 7; or
(iii) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz double lot winner) which would itself be adjacent to a block in a series of other contiguous blocks of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to 26 GHz double lot winners), provided that one block in this series would include 26 GHz lot 7; and
(d) if the bidder is a 26 GHz lower only lot winner, at least one of the following four conditions would be satisfied—
(i) the block would include 26 GHz lot 1;
(ii) the block would be adjacent to the block of leftover 26 GHz lower lots;
(iii) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz lower only lot winner) which would include 26 GHz lot 1;
(iv) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz lower only lot winner) which would itself be adjacent to a block in a series of other contiguous blocks of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to 26 GHz lower only lot winners), provided that one block in this series would include 26 GHz lot 1; or
(v) the block would be adjacent to a block in a series of contiguous blocks, which comprises the block of leftover 26 GHz lower lots and blocks containing 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to 26 GHz lower only lot winners).
(1) In order to bid for a 26 GHz lower assignment stage option, a bidder must specify on the assignment stage form either a value of zero pounds or an amount in whole thousands of pounds that it is willing to pay, in addition to the total 26 GHz lower base price for that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz lower lots, for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies corresponding to the block of numbered 26 GHz lower lots that is the 26 GHz lower assignment stage option.
(2) A bidder may make no more than one 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for each 26 GHz lower assignment stage option.
(3) A bidder is not required to make a 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid.
(4) A 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid is a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid if—
(a) the bid is specified on a valid assignment stage form; and
(b) the bidder has paid the full sum of the required first assignment stage round deposit by the deadline specified by OFCOM.
(5) Where a bidder does not make a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for a 26 GHz lower assignment stage option that bidder will be deemed to have made a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 26 GHz lower assignment stage option.
(6) Where there is only one assignment stage option on a bidder’s 26 GHz lower assignment stage options list, that bidder shall be deemed to have made a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 26 GHz lower assignment stage option.
78 Determination of the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids
(1) OFCOM shall determine the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids after the deadline for paying the required first assignment stage round deposit.
(2) The winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids shall be those valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids that comprise the winning combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids.
(3) The winning combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids shall be the valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids having the highest total value of amounts bid.
(4) A combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids is a valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids if—
(a) within that combination there is one valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid from each winning bidder for 26 GHz lower lots;
(b) each of those valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids is for a 26 GHz lower assignment stage option as determined by OFCOM for the bidder;
(c) no numbered 26 GHz lower lot is included in more than one of the 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids included in the combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids; and
(d) the leftover numbered 26 GHz lower lots not included in that combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids, taken together, form a single block of numbered 26 GHz lower lots which would include 26 GHz lot 1.
(5) Where there is more than one valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids for which the total value is equal highest, OFCOM shall employ a method of random selection from amongst those valid combinations of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids for which the value is equal highest to determine the winning combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids.
79 Determination of 26 GHz lower lot first period additional prices
In respect of each winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid, OFCOM shall determine an amount in whole pounds (“26 GHz lower lot first period additional price”) which shall be payable by the relevant winning bidder in accordance with Schedule 5.