OFCOM shall complete the award process by publishing on OFCOM’s website—
(a) the names of the winning bidders to whom licences were granted, and, in relation to each of them—
(i) the frequencies in respect of which the licences were granted; and
(ii) the licence fees paid;
(b) the names of any winning bidders who, following the passing of the deadline under regulation 115, had an amount on deposit which is less than the total auction sum payable by them to OFCOM, and, in relation to each of them—
(i) the frequencies in respect of which, if they held on deposit an amount equal to the total auction sum, licences would have been granted; and
(ii) the total auction sum payable to OFCOM;
(c) details of all valid principal stage bids;
(d) details of all valid assignment stage bids for 40 GHz lots, 26 GHz lower lots, 26 GHz upper lots and 26 GHz second period lots; and
(e) details of any lot assignments made without bidding.
121 Forfeit of deposit and exclusion from award process
(1) If, in relation to an applicant which is qualified to bid or a bidder, OFCOM are satisfied that any of the events specified in regulation 123 are occurring (or have occurred) and that the occurrence would materially affect the outcome of the award process—
(a) any sum paid as a deposit under these Regulations shall be forfeited (together with any interest which has accrued on the deposit) by, and not refunded to, the applicant or bidder concerned; and
(b) that applicant or bidder may also be excluded from the award process by OFCOM giving that applicant or bidder notice in writing.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if OFCOM are satisfied that any of the events specified in regulations 123(2)(d), 123(2)(e) or 123(2)(g)(ii) are occurring (or have occurred) after the notification to all bidders of the results of the third assignment stage round in accordance with regulation 101(4) OFCOM shall not require any deposit to be forfeited and shall not exclude any bidder.
(1) Where a bidder is excluded from the award process under regulation 121 during the principal stage, OFCOM shall determine whether it should disregard the bids (and other bidding indications) made in any principal stage rounds prior to the exclusion, in order to have a fair and efficient outcome to the award process.
(2) Where OFCOM determine that it is appropriate to disregard the bids (and other bidding indications) made in any principal stage rounds—
(a) OFCOM shall notify bidders of the rounds for which they have determined to disregard the bids (and other bidding indications); and
(b) resume the award process from the start of the principal stage round after the round for which bids are not disregarded under sub-paragraph (a), or, where all bids are to be disregarded under that sub-paragraph, to rerun the award process from the start of the first principal stage round.
(3) Where a bidder is excluded from the award process under regulation 121 during the assignment stage, OFCOM shall determine whether it should disregard the bids (and other bidding indications) made in any principal stage round prior to the exclusion in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2).
(1) The events referred to in regulation 121 are the events in paragraph (2).
(2) Events in relation to an applicant or bidder are—
(a) the submission to OFCOM of any information in connection with the award process which is false or misleading;
(b) any member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group colluding or attempting to collude with another person to distort the outcome of the bidding in the award process;
(c) any member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group acting in a way which is likely to distort the outcome of the award process;
(d) any member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group, or any person to whom confidential information has been disclosed, disclosing, or attempting to disclose, or inciting another person to disclose, any confidential information, whether directly or indirectly, to any person, except where the disclosure is—
(i) to OFCOM;
(ii) to a member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group;
(iii) to a provider of finance for the purpose of raising finance for a bid; or
(iv) to a person for the purpose of enabling that person to decide whether to participate as a member of the applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group;
(e) any member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group obtaining or attempting to obtain confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder;
(f) any member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group receiving or attempting to receive services in relation to the award process from any person who has provided or is providing, since the date of submission of the applications, services to OFCOM in relation to the award process;
(g) any person who is a member or a director or employee of a member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group and also a director or employee of a member of another bidder group—
(i) taking part in the preparation of both bidder groups for participation in the award process; or
(ii) receiving confidential information relating to both bidder groups;
(h) a member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group is or becomes a member of another applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group; and
(i) a change occurring in the membership of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group from that notified to OFCOM in its application except as a result of—
(i) a person ceasing to be a member of that bidder group;
(ii) a person joining that bidder group under the procedure in regulation 7(3); or
(iii) a person becoming an associate through merger or acquisition activity provided that such activity is not for a purpose related to the award process.
124 Alternative method for submission of principal stage bids
(1) Where OFCOM are satisfied that a bidder is unable to submit bids by using the auction system because of technical failure (or an event or circumstance with similar effect on the bidder’s ability to use the auction system), OFCOM shall notify the bidder of an alternative method of submitting bids and any requirements relating to the authentication of communications made by means of the alternative method.
(2) The bidder must submit the bids by means of the alternative method and must comply with any requirements which have been notified to it under paragraph (1) relating to the authentication of communications.
(3) Where bids have been submitted using an alternative method and due to the manner of submission bids are incomplete or defective, but OFCOM believe that they can ascertain the bidder’s intention in relation to the matters set out in regulation 21, 27, 28, 29 and 30, OFCOM shall ask the bidder to confirm in a notice to OFCOM by a deadline specified by OFCOM that OFCOM have correctly ascertained the bidder’s intention in relation to its decisions.
(4) Where the bidder confirms in a notice given to OFCOM by the deadline which is signed by two authorised persons that OFCOM have correctly ascertained the bidder’s intention, bids shall be accepted by OFCOM on that basis.
(5) Where the bidder does not give such confirmation, the principal stage bids submitted in their entirety shall be disregarded, and—
(a) in respect of a lot type for which it had a notified posted demand of zero for that lot type following the most recent round, the bidder shall be deemed to have submitted a bid to maintain demand; and
(b) in respect of a lot type for which it had notified posted demand greater than zero for that lot type following the most recent round, the bidder shall be deemed to have selected a target number of zero lots, nominated the opening price, and shall be deemed to have submitted a simple set of bids to decrease demand.
OFCOM may, at any time, notify any applicant or bidder of its exclusion from the award process, if required to do so by any direction given by the Secretary of State to OFCOM under section 5 of the Communications Act 2003 or if, after OFCOM’s determination under regulation 8(1) (and notwithstanding that determination), in their opinion the applicant or bidder is not a fit and proper person to hold a licence.
If, in accordance with any provision of these Regulations, an applicant or bidder is required, or wishes, to notify OFCOM of any fact or circumstance, it must do so by notice in writing which is marked for the attention of the OFCOM personnel who are specified by OFCOM for that purpose on OFCOM’s website and must deliver that notice to OFCOM by electronic mail to an electronic mail address dedicated to the award process.
(1) Subject to regulations 128 and 129, paragraph (2) applies where OFCOM determine that it is impracticable for any reason—
(a) for any document which is to be delivered to OFCOM under these Regulations to be delivered at the place specified or by the deadline specified under these Regulations; or
(b) for any action which is required to be undertaken in accordance with these Regulations to be completed by the deadline specified.
(2) Where this paragraph applies, OFCOM shall take reasonable steps to notify applicants or bidders that—
(a) delivery must be made on a different day or within different times on that day or at a different place; and
(b) the action must be completed on a different day or by a different deadline.
128 Changes to round times and use of auction system
(1) Where a time for the start of a round has been notified to bidders and OFCOM determine that it is impracticable for any reason to start the round at that time, OFCOM shall take reasonable steps to notify bidders of a revised time for the start of the round.
(2) Where a time for the end of a round has been notified to bidders and OFCOM determine that it is impracticable for any reason for the round to end at that time, OFCOM shall take reasonable steps to notify bidders of a revised time for the end of the round.
(3) Where OFCOM determine that it is impracticable for any reason to use the auction system for any of the purposes specified in these Regulations, OFCOM shall take reasonable steps to notify bidders of an alternative method of participating in the award process and any requirements relating to the authentication of communications made by means of the alternative method.
(4) Bidders must use the alternative method of participating in the award process in accordance with a notification under paragraph (3).
(1) Paragraph (2) applies where a round is in progress and OFCOM determine that it is not possible to continue the round because of—
(a) technical failure; or
(b) an event or circumstance with similar effect to technical failure on the continuation of the round.
(2) Where this paragraph applies, OFCOM shall—
(a) take reasonable steps to notify bidders of their determination under paragraph (1);
(b) disregard the bids (and other bidding indications) made in that round; and resume the award process from the end of the most recent round.
(3) Paragraph (4) applies where OFCOM determine that it is not possible to continue the award process in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations because of—
(a) technical failure; or
(b) an event or circumstance with similar effect to technical failure on the continuation of the award process.
(4) Where this paragraph applies, OFCOM shall—
(a) determine the rounds for which bids (and other bidding indications) made in those rounds should be disregarded in order to have a fair and efficient outcome to the award process;
(b) take reasonable steps to notify bidders of their determinations under paragraph (3) and sub-paragraph (a); and
(c) resume the award process from the end of the latest round for which bids (and other bidding indications) are not disregarded under sub-paragraph (a), or, where all bids (and other bidding indications) are to be disregarded under that sub-paragraph, to rerun the award process from the start of the first principal stage round.
OFCOM may, in such cases as they think fit, refund, in whole or in part, sums which have been paid to them in accordance with any provision of these Regulations.
In determining under these Regulations the amount that an applicant or bidder has on deposit OFCOM shall disregard any sum forfeited under these Regulations and any interest which may have accrued on any deposit.
Regulations 2(2), 2(3) and 2(4)
In these Regulations—
(a) “26 GHz lot” means any of the 26 GHz lots numbered 1 to 12 in Column (1) of Table 1 or Table 2 comprising the frequencies listed in the corresponding entry in Column (2) of the same table;
(b) “26 GHz lower lot” means any of the 26 GHz lots numbered 1 to 7 listed in Column (1) of Table 1 comprising the frequencies listed in the corresponding entry in Column (2) of the same table;
(c) “26 GHz upper lot” means any of the 26 GHz lots numbered 8 to 12 listed in Column (1) of Table 2 comprising the frequencies listed in the corresponding entry in Column (2) of the same table;
(d) “40 GHz lot” means any of the 40 GHz lots numbered 1 to 15 listed in Column (1) of Table 3 comprising the frequencies listed in the corresponding entry in Column (2) of the same table;
(e) “lot” means a 26 GHz lot or a 40 GHz lot;
(f) a reference to a “type of lot” or “lot type” shall be construed as a reference to any of the three different lot types in paragraphs (b), (c), or (d);
(g) a reference to a numbered 26 GHz lot or a numbered 40 GHz lot means the lot with that number in Column (1) of Table 1, Table 2 or Table 3 (as the case may be); and
(h) a reference to a “block” of 26 GHz lots or 40 GHz lots is to be construed as a reference to a block of sequentially numbered lots.
Table 1
26 GHz lower lots | Frequencies
26 GHz lot 1 | 25.1-25.3 GHz
26 GHz lot 2 | 25.3-25.5 GHz
26 GHz lot 3 | 25.5-25.7 GHz
26 GHz lot 4 | 25.7-25.9 GHz
26 GHz lot 5 | 25.9-26.1 GHz
26 GHz lot 6 | 26.1-26.3 GHz
26 GHz lot 7 | 26.3-26.5 GHz
Table 2
26 GHz upper lots | Frequencies
26 GHz lot 8 | 26.5-26.7 GHz
26 GHz lot 9 | 26.7-26.9 GHz
26 GHz lot 10 | 26.9-27.1 GHz
26 GHz lot 11 | 27.1-27.3 GHz
26 GHz lot 12 | 27.3-27.5 GHz
Table 3
40 GHz lots | Frequencies
40 GHz lot 1 | 40.5-40.7 GHz
40 GHz lot 2 | 40.7-40.9 GHz
40 GHz lot 3 | 40.9-41.1 GHz
40 GHz lot 4 | 41.1-41.3 GHz
40 GHz lot 5 | 41.3-41.5 GHz
40 GHz lot 6 | 41.5-41.7 GHz
40 GHz lot 7 | 41.7-41.9 GHz
40 GHz lot 8 | 41.9-42.1 GHz
40 GHz lot 9 | 42.1-42.3 GHz
40 GHz lot 10 | 42.3-42.5 GHz
40 GHz lot 11 | 42.5-42.7 GHz
40 GHz lot 12 | 42.7-42.9 GHz
40 GHz lot 13 | 42.9-43.1 GHz
40 GHz lot 14 | 43.1-43.3 GHz
40 GHz lot 15 | 43.3-43.5 GHz
Regulation 4(3)(a)(i)
1. Details of the applicant
Provide the following details for the applicant—
Applicant’s full name
Registered number of company
Registered office of company
Bank sort code and account number
Name of individual contact within applicant
Contact address (if different from registered office)
Contact telephone number
Contact mobile telephone number
Contact electronic mail address
2. Authorised persons
Provide details of the name and position in the applicant of at least three and no more than five persons, each of whom has authority to bind the applicant for all purposes relating to the award process. Also provide a specimen signature of each of these persons.
3. Directors or members of managing body
Provide the name and job title of each of the directors of the applicant or each of the members of the managing body of the applicant.
4. Applicant group
Provide the names of the applicant’s associates (as defined in the Wireless Telegraphy (Licence Award) Regulations 2025 (“the Regulations”)) and for each provide details of their material interest (as defined in the Regulations) in the applicant.
Provide the names of all other members of the applicant group (as defined in the Regulations) in respect of which the applicant has completed a document in the form set out in Schedule 3 to the Regulations in accordance with regulation 4(3)(a)(ii) of the Regulations.
5. Qualification to bid
In relation to the determination by the Office of Communications (“OFCOM”) under regulation 8 of the Regulations—
(a) provide details of any reason why the applicant may not be a fit and proper person to hold a licence;
(b) state whether any member of the applicant’s applicant group has colluded, or attempted to collude, or is colluding or attempting to collude, with another person to distort the outcome of the award process and provide a description of any such collusion;
(c) state whether any member of the applicant’s applicant group has acted or is acting in a way which is likely to distort the outcome of the award process and provide a description of any such actions;
(d) state whether any member of the applicant’s applicant group, or any person to whom confidential information has been disclosed, has disclosed, or is disclosing or attempting to disclose or has incited or is inciting another person to disclose, any confidential information, whether directly or indirectly, to any person, and provide a description of the circumstances of any disclosure and the information disclosed, except where the disclosure—
(i) is or was to a member of the applicant’s applicant group;
(ii) is or was to OFCOM;
(iii) is or was to a provider of finance for the purpose of raising finance for the applicant’s application; or
(iv) is or was to a person for the purpose of enabling that person to decide whether to participate as a member of the applicant’s bidder group;
(e) state whether any member of the applicant’s applicant group has obtained or is obtaining or attempting to obtain confidential information relating to another applicant and provide a description of any such circumstances;
(f) state whether any member of the applicant’s applicant group is receiving or is attempting to receive services in relation to the award process from any person who has provided or is providing services to OFCOM in relation to the award process and provide a description of the services concerned; and
(g) state whether (and provide a description of any circumstances in which) any person who is a member or a director or employee of a member of the applicant’s applicant group and also a director or employee of a member of another applicant group is—
(i) taking part in the preparation of both applicant groups for participation in the award process; or
(ii) receiving confidential information relating to both applicant groups.
6. Other information
Provide a brief description of the substance of—
(a) agreements (if any) relating to the management of the applicant; and
(b) any criminal investigations or proceedings in the United Kingdom or overseas of which the applicant is aware relating to the applicant or any member of its applicant group or its directors or officers.
7. Warranty
Provide the following warranty—
[Insert name of applicant] (the “applicant”) represents and warrants to the Office of Communications that—
(a) the persons authorised in section 2 of this application have read and understood the Regulations, the terms of the licences to be granted under the Regulations, and the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006;
(b) the applicant has the legal authority to participate in the award process under the Regulations and to have a licence granted to it, and has in place all necessary consents, permissions and internal approvals for this purpose;
(c) the information provided in, or in support of, the application is, to the best of the knowledge and belief of the applicant, true, accurate and complete in all material respects; and
(d) the applicant is aware of the provisions in regulations 121 and 123 of the Regulations, including the provisions about disclosure of confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) and obtaining confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder and that any such activities may lead to forfeiture of sums on deposit and exclusion from the award process.
SCHEDULE 3 Document for member of applicant’s applicant group or bidder group who is not an associate
Regulation 4(3)(a)(ii)
[Insert name of applicant or bidder] (the “applicant/bidder”) wishes to include [insert name and address of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate] as a member of the applicant/bidder’s applicant or bidder group as defined in the Wireless Telegraphy (Licence Award) Regulations 2025 (“the Regulations”) for the purpose of the award process under the Regulations.
Under regulation 8 of the Regulations an applicant shall not be qualified to bid in the award process where a member of its bidder group is also a member of another applicant’s bidder group. Regulations 121 and 123 contain provisions on disclosure of confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) and obtaining confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder. Under the Regulations such activities may lead to forfeiture of sums on deposit and exclusion from the award process.
Applicant/bidder
In relation to regulations 8, 121 and 123 of the Regulations, the applicant/bidder represents and warrants to the Office of Communications (“OFCOM”) that so far as it is aware, having made all reasonable enquiries, [insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate] is not a member of any other applicant’s or bidder’s applicant or bidder group.
The applicant/bidder undertakes to inform OFCOM immediately if it becomes aware that [insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate]—
(a) has ever been or becomes a member of any other applicant’s or bidder’s applicant or bidder group;
(b) has ever been or becomes a subsidiary of a member of any other applicant’s or bidder’s applicant or bidder group during the award process; or
(c) has ever obtained or ever obtains confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) relating to another applicant or bidder.
[Insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate]
[Insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate] represents and warrants to OFCOM that it—
(a) consents to be a member of the applicant/bidder’s applicant or bidder group;
(b) is not a member of any other applicant’s or bidder’s applicant or bidder group; and
(c) is aware of the provisions in regulations 8, 121 and 123 of the Regulations about disclosure of confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) and obtaining confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder.
[Insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate] undertakes to OFCOM that it will immediately inform OFCOM and the applicant/bidder—
(a) if it has ever been or becomes a member of any other applicant’s or bidder’s applicant or bidder group;
(b) if it has ever been or becomes a subsidiary of a member of any other applicant’s or bidder’s applicant or bidder group during the award process; or
(c) if it has ever obtained or if it ever obtains confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) relating to another applicant or bidder.
SCHEDULE 4 Determination of 40 GHz lot additional prices
Regulation 74
Additional price
1 (1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.
(2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.
First requirement
2 The additional price for each winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid.
Second requirement
3 (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—
(a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 40 GHz assignment stage option selected in its winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid”), and
(b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid,
the combination of the reduced winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 40 GHz assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.
(2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.
(3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.
Third requirement
4 Taking the additional prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.
Fourth requirement
5 (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.
(2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA=∑(p A-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—
(a) “pA” is the additional price for a winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid for winner A; and
(b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid.
(3) The formula is cA = bA – (t – uA) where—
(a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);
(b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids; and
(c) “bA” is the amount of the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid for which pA is the price.
(4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 40 GHz assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 40 GHz assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 40 GHz assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.
(5) Where the amount of a 40 GHz assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 40 GHz assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.
Interpretation
6 In this Schedule “valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 73(4).
SCHEDULE 5 Determination of 26 GHz lower lot first period additional prices
Regulation 79
Additional price
1 (1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.
(2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.
First requirement
2 The additional price for each winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid.
Second requirement
3 (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—
(a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 26 GHz lower assignment stage option selected in its winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid”), and
(b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid,
the combination of the reduced winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.
(2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.
(3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.
Third requirement
4 Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.
Fourth requirement
5 (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.
(2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA= ∑(p A-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—
(a) “pA” is the price for a winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for winner A; and
(b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid.
(3) The formula is cA = bA – (t – uA) where—
(a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);
(b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids; and
(c) “bA” is the amount of the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for which pA is the price.
(4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.
(5) Where the amount of a 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.
Interpretation
6 In this Schedule “valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 78(4).
SCHEDULE 6 Determination of 26 GHz upper lot first period additional prices
Regulation 84
Additional price
1 (1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.
(2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.
First requirement
2 The additional price for each winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid.
Second requirement
3 (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—
(a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 26 GHz upper assignment stage option selected in its winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid”), and
(b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid,
the combination of the reduced winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.
(2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.
(3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.
Third requirement
4 Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.
Fourth requirement
5 (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.
(2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA= ∑(p A-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—
(a) “pA” is the price for a winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for winner A; and
(b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid.
(3) The formula is cA = bA – (t – uA) where—
(a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);
(b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids; and
(c) “bA” is the amount of the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for which pA is the price.
(4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.
(5) Where the amount of a 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.
Interpretation
6 In this Schedule “valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 83(4).
SCHEDULE 7 Determination of 26 GHz lot second period additional prices
Regulation 90
Additional price
1 (1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.
(2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.
First requirement
2 The additional price for each winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid.
Second requirement
3 (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—
(a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option selected in its winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid”), and
(b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid,
the combination of the reduced winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.
(2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.
(3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.
Third requirement
4 Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.
Fourth requirement
5 (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.
(2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA= ∑(p A-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—
(a) “pA” is the price for a winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for winner A; and
(b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid.
(3) The formula is cA = bA – (t – uA) where—
(a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);
(b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids; and
(c) “bA” is the amount of the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for which p A is the price.
(4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.
(5) Where the amount of a 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.
Interpretation
6 In this Schedule “valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 89(4).